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Main findings
The Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework presents a window of opportunity to 
increase its ambition level and for improving the effectiveness of global biodiversity 
governance via the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Improving the performance 
of the CBD is much needed as countries have largely have failed to achieve the goals they 
have agreed within the CBD. Stronger involvement of non-state and sub-national actors 
(e.g. cities, regions, indigenous peoples and local communities, companies, and civil 
society organisations) to commit and contribute to biodiversity conservation could be a 
feasible and impactful way forward.
At CBD COP-14 in Egypt in 2018, Parties decided to encourage non-state and sub-national 
actors to make voluntary commitments that contribute to the CBD objectives and the 
post-2020 biodiversity framework. In addition, the ‘Sharm El-Sheikh to Kunming Action 
Agenda for Nature and People’ was launched to catalyse non-state and sub-national 
initiatives that could ‘bend the curve of biodiversity loss’. 
The ‘Action Agenda for Nature and People’ is potentially a powerful vehicle for 
increasing the ambition level of global biodiversity policy and move towards 
rapid and scalable implementation. 
Including non-state and sub-national actors in the post-2020 biodiversity framework 
has a at least seven possible benefits. These include:
1. engaging more and more diverse actors in halting biodiversity loss;
2. provide a platform to showcase ongoing non-state and sub-national biodiversity action; 
3. mainstreaming biodiversity into relevant economic sectors and across society; 
4. building a positive momentum around global biodiversity conservation in the run up to 
COP-15 in China in 2020;
5. building confidence for governments to adopt more ambitious biodiversity goals at 
COP-15, knowing that non-state and sub-national actors support stronger action; 
6. fostering innovative and experimental partnerships and initiatives breaking gridlocks; 
7. providing governance functions that complement public policies, such as new 
standards and commitments, funding, creating and disseminating information, and 
executing projects on the ground.
This report finds that public, private and civil society actors already engage in a plethora 
of international cooperative initiatives. It identifies 331 international cooperative 
initiatives forming a crowded and diverse governance landscape, with increasing 
participation of private and civil society actors, and including public, hybrid and private 
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organisational forms of collaboration. 33% of the initiatives comprise only public actors 
such as national governments, regions and cities; 21% of the initiatives are hybrid, 
meaning that they include public, private and civil society actors and 28% of the initiatives 
are private, i.e. they involve only companies and/or civil society organisations.  
A transnational regime complex for global biodiversity governance is emerging and will 
likely continue to develop ‘beyond the CBD’, involving thousands of non-state and 
sub-national actors in the quest for halting biodiversity loss, but retaining a strong role for 
governments and other public actors. 
Existing international cooperative initiatives align well with the current goals of  
the CBD and the Aichi targets. Initiatives are predominantly focusing on information 
sharing and networking (60%) followed by operational, on the ground, activities (33%) 
and third, standards and commitments (26%). The least common function is financing 
(17%). Initiatives are active in areas with high biodiversity values, managed landscapes and 
urban areas, focussing both on conservation as well as on sustainable use in relevant 
production sectors. They also include activities reflecting the multiple values of nature. 
The sectors with most activities, in terms of number of initiatives, are agriculture and 
forestry. Mapping the geographical coverage of the initiatives suggests a wide distribution 
of activities. There is much activity in Europe and most part of the African continent. 
However, parts of Asia, primarily China and India, as well as Latin America features much 
less. Referring to a subset of initiatives (n = 99), about 80% have some kind of monitoring 
in place suggesting awareness and possibility to track progress. Yet less than 50% have 
annual reporting and only about a fourth of the initiatives have quantitative targets, 
making evaluation efforts challenging.
How can the CBD fully harness the potential of existing international cooperative 
initiatives for biodiversity for the ‘Action Agenda for Nature and People’? We suggest 
that at this stage leadership is key to make the Action Agenda an effective part of the 
post-2020 framework. Leadership is urgently needed to provide impetus; to structure and 
coordinate activities; and, build and maintain coalitions and partnerships. 
Short-term priorities – prior to COP-15
Taking into account lessons learned from the climate change policy arena and the 
implementation of the Global Climate Action Agenda, the Oceans agenda and the SDGs,  
we suggest the following actions prior to COP-15:
• Developing the narrative for the Action Agenda further, including explaining its 
priorities, functions and purpose, and to communicate this widely. Non-state and 
sub-national actors have to see that there is much to gain from being part of this 
societal mobilisation, and much to lose if one is not a part of it. 
• Generating as many voluntary commitments by non-state and sub-national actors,  
and countries as possible and showcasing them at the portal for the Action Agenda.
• Linking the Action Agenda for Nature and People to other action agendas and portals, 
such as on climate change, oceans, and the SDGs.
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• Limiting the administrative burden for making commitments, but with some basic 
process criteria to ensure credibility. At a minimum, commitments need to indicate 
ambition levels (what to achieve), how to achieve them (measures) and how monitoring 
and reporting will be done. These commitments need to be publicly available and 
transparent to facilitate learning. 
Challenges for successfully implementing the Action Agenda 
We also identified some challenges for the CBD to develop and implement the Action 
Agenda successfully. 
• Coordination: who should coordinate non-state and sub-national biodiversity action and 
how? The CBD Secretariat, for instance, is unlikely to have the willingness or capacity to 
take on such a potentially immense task of guiding a vast and heterogeneous group of 
actors. Instead, the Secretariat – in collaboration with other key organisations such as 
the IUCN, ICLEI or the Natural Capital Coalition – could provide a focal point for 
facilitating dialogue between partners during and between COPs. Such a ‘soft touch’ 
approach could have the purpose to build coalitions of the willing among governments, 
cities, companies and civil society organisations that could spearhead the Action Agenda.
• Shirking: how to avoid that national governments shirk established norms and 
responsibilities under the CBD, referring to action being carried out outside the formal 
negotiations? This will require the development of accountability systems that include 
combined analysis of both national commitments as well as non-state and sub-national 
commitments. Periodic assessments of the progress made by non-state and sub-national 
actors could be carried out by a broader analytical community consisting of 
international organisations, think tanks, academia and other research organisations. 
One format possible could be the annual Gap Reports produced by UNEP within the 
climate change policy domain. 
• Transparency: how to know if international cooperative initiatives contribute to 
achieving biodiversity goals? Learnings for success of international cooperative 
initiatives include improved MRV procedures, enhanced involvement of relevant actors 
and disclosure to enhance transparency. Science-based targets and methodologies that 
could be used at a national or sectoral level would allow non-state and sub-national 
actors to set their own targets aligned with international goals to identify appropriate 
strategies and actions. 
• Credibility: How avoid greenwashing and ‘bluewashing’? If companies use the CBD for 
public relation purposes without having demonstrated actual improvements to 
biodiversity it would harm the credibility and effectiveness of the Action Agenda. It is 
therefore key to carry out analysis and transparency, providing decision-makers in both 
private and public organisations with the proper basis for deciding whether to engage 
in or support an initiative. 
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Further involvement of non-state and sub-national actors in the post-2020 global 
biodiversity framework possibly will make a positive contribution to achieving new 
globally agreed targets. A first step would be to harness the potential power of those 
thousands of cities, civil society organisations, companies, indigenous peoples and 
regions already taking action for biodiversity in international cooperative initiatives. 
Showcasing their concrete actions could help to increase state ambitions, by showing the 
willingness of non-state and sub-national actors to take action within their respective 
sectors and realms. However, to create a strong Action Agenda in the coming 18 months, 
leadership from the CBD and its parties is needed. 
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1 Introduction
New directions need to be considered for the post-2020 framework of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) to increase its ambition level and for improving the effectiveness 
of global biodiversity governance. One possible way forward is to further involve cities, 
regions, indigenous peoples and local communities, companies, and civil society 
organisations (from here on: non-state and sub-national actors) in governing biodiversity 
conservation and its sustainable use. 
At COP-14 of the CBD in Egypt in 2018, Parties agreed to encourage non-state and 
sub-national actors to make voluntary commitments that contribute to the achievement 
of CBD objectives and the development of the post-2020 biodiversity framework (CBD, 
2018a). Egypt, China and the secretariat of the CBD also launched, what is now called,  
the ‘Sharm El-Sheikh to Kunming Action Agenda for Nature and People’ (CBD, 2018b).  
The Action Agenda aims to catalyse actions from all sectors and stakeholders in support  
of biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use. More specifically, its objectives are:  
(1) to raise public awareness about the urgent need to halt biodiversity loss and to restore biodiversity 
health; (2) to inspire and help implement nature-based solutions to meet key global challenges; and (3) to 
catalyse cooperative initiatives across sectors and stakeholders in support of the global biodiversity goals. 
As one of the first steps towards the development of the Action Agenda, at the ‘Nature 
Champions Summit’, organised by Canada in April 2019, the coalition of Nature Champions 
– including international leaders from philanthropy, industry, non-governmental 
organisations, United Nations agencies, Indigenous peoples and governments – called for 
a ‘widening the participation in the Convention on Biological Diversity beyond governments to include 
commitments and actions by a wide range of actors’. The Nature Champions Coalition aims at a 
global mobilisation with its call to action. This was also confirmed by the G7 Environment 
meeting in Metz, May 2019.
Such global mobilisation is indeed starting to take place through initiatives taken by, for 
example, city networks, business-for-nature coalitions, concerned citizens and ocean 
initiatives. An online platform hosted on the CBD website has been set up to start mapping 
current global efforts (see www.cbd.int/climate-action/). Work on operationalising the 
‘Action Agenda for Nature and People’ is still under development with a view to build 
momentum in the run-up to COP-15 and as part of the post-2020 global biodiversity 
framework. 
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This policy brief aims to inform policymakers and stakeholders about: (1) the emerging 
international biodiversity governance landscape, in particular international cooperative 
initiatives; (2) the potential of greater non-state and sub-national actor involvement in the 
development and implementation of the post-2020 global biodiversity framework; and (3) 
possible ways forward to harness the potential of non-state and sub-national action 
through the Action Agenda.
The policy brief has three chapters. First, it discusses the new dynamics in global 
biodiversity governance and the potential benefits from deliberately engaging non-state 
and sub-national actors. Second, it maps and analyses the international governance 
landscape providing an overview of international cooperative initiatives currently in place 
and eventually also how they perform with regards to conserving biodiversity and its 
sustainable use. The analysis addresses the following questions: how many biodiversity-
related cooperative initiatives exist? What functions do they perform and what form do 
they take (public, hybrid, private)? In how far do they align with the CBD goals and Aichi 
targets, as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? Where are they operating? 
And do they have Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) mechanisms in place? 
Third, the policy brief discusses possible ways forward, based on mapping, investigating if 
and how these actors could be further integrated into the process and what the post-2020 
framework could provide to enable further contributions by non-state actors to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity? 
This policy brief is based on different sources including earlier analysis drawing lessons 
from the Paris Climate Agreement for the CBD post-2020 framework (Kok et al., 2018), a 
recent academic paper on the Action Agenda for Nature and People (Pattberg et al., 2019), 
database analysis of the existing landscape of cooperative initiatives (e.g. Pattberg et al., 
2017) and insights derived from a multi-stakeholder workshop on operationalising the 
action agenda (Kok et al., 2019).
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2   How the Action 
Agenda for Nature 




Global biodiversity governance is facing a major challenge. As scientists are tallying the 
results of the efforts during the last 30 years to halt biodiversity, it is becoming abundantly 
clear that countries largely have failed to achieve the goals they have agreed within the 
CBD to conserve and sustainably use nature; most recently the ambitions of the 2020 Aichi 
Targets (Brondizio et al., 2019; Tittensor et al., 2014). Halting biodiversity loss and restoring 
nature requires much broader action by states, non-state and sub-national actors (Hajer  
et al., 2015). Innovative institutional arrangements are needed for the global community 
to ‘bend the curve’ of biodiversity loss (Biermann et al., 2012; Mace et al., 2018). 
2.1 Rethinking biodiversity governance
Multilateral responses to multiple global challenges are failing on several fronts. 
Observers note that multilateral institutions have become ‘gridlocked’ and ‘pathological’ 
negotiation processes based on rules and customs developed during the previous century 
are unfit for 21th century global problems (Hale et al., 2013). The CBD is a case in point 
where little progress have been made by the global international community to 
significantly halt biodiversity loss (Brondizio et al., 2019).
It is necessary to rethink global biodiversity governance to break the gridlock and bend 
the curve of biodiversity loss. The Action Agenda for Nature and People offers a possibility 
to engage a broader coalition of non-state and sub-national actors, and change 
biodiversity governance. It could contribute to breaking institutional gridlocks by 
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inspiring government to increase their ambition levels; building new multi-stakeholder 
coalitions to take up implementation; and finding innovative solutions to existing 
problems such as the lack of involvement of key economic sectors or lack of finance.  
The Action Agenda reflects a broader trend from government to governance in which global 
governance is no longer carried out solely through intergovernmental cooperation and 
multilateral organisations, but also through an international community including public 
and private actors such as cities, companies and civil society organisations. The Action 
Agenda also reflects a world which is moving from single-issue environmental governance 
dominated by governments to a wider network of intertwined governance institutions 
and actors connecting various issue areas (Biermann et al., 2009). Issues such as climate 
change, biodiversity and health are not compartmentalised to single institutions but, 
instead, are ruled by networks of institutions and actors trying to realise their objectives 
through different forms of governance (also referred to as ‘modes of governance’), 
including hierarchical governance, markets, networks and self-organisation.
Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel laureate in economics, made a pertinent claim arguing 
that ‘instead of focusing only on global efforts (which are indeed a necessary part of the long-term 
solution), it is better to encourage polycentric efforts’ suggesting that we should move away from 
thinking in terms of ‘global solutions’ and instead think of a multitude of smaller efforts 
that jointly create a more effective solution to common problems (2010, p. 550).  
For decision-makers, polycentricity presents a formidable governance challenge in terms 
of navigating and intervening in a complex landscape of institutions and initiatives, state, 
non-state, sub-national or hybrid, trying the assess where and how to get the best ‘bang 
for your buck’. When global issues move from being negotiated in single institutions to a 
network of initiatives and institutions, it changes the required skill set, capacities and 
toolbox for pursuing ones interest internationally (Slaughter, 2017). 
The discussion on a post-2020 framework for the CBD is thus a window of opportunity for 
inserting new dynamics into global biodiversity governance based on principles of 
polycentricity, networked institutions and international cooperative initiatives.
2.2 Learning from other policy domains
Important lessons for the post-2020 biodiversity framework about the potential of 
involving non-state and sub-national actors can be drawn from other policy domains,  
in particular climate change, the 2030 development agenda and ocean governance. 
From the UNFCCC process and the Global Climate Action Agenda which emerged in the 
years leading up to the Paris Agreement, important lessons for CBD can be drawn regarding 
the strategic role of the secretariat of the UNFCCC in building momentum towards the 
Paris Agreement. To mobilise non-state action, it was important to align the ‘imaginaries’ 
of all actors involved; sending the message that, by not committing to climate action, 
Parties would risk being ‘left out’ of history (Kok et al., 2018). This mindset has major 
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economic implications, among them the risks posed by stranded assets and the need for 
rapid divestment from fossils. Moreover, as non-state discussions are less constrained 
than formal, multilateral negotiations, they have facilitated the emergence of rather 
difficult topics, such as those on some key sectoral drivers of climate change. Lastly, the 
Global Climate Action Agenda has also been a way to increase and channel the energy of a 
multitude of international cooperative initiatives, because it helps to link these initiatives 
to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, creating a common focus in attention and 
energy (Chan et al., 2015; Kok et al., 2018, 2019; Rankovic et al., 2019; Widerberg, 2017). 
In the context of 2030 sustainable development agenda and the SDGs, cooperative 
initiatives have featured prominently. SDG 17 on revitalising the global partnership for 
sustainable development explicitly acknowledges the contribution by multi-stakeholder 
partnerships, a specific form of cooperative initiatives, to achieving the SDGs. The UN has 
created a partnerships platform (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships.html) 
for cooperative initiatives to register their actions. To date, the SD in Action Registry 
counts over 2,000 voluntary commitments and partnerships dealing with various aspects 
of sustainability, including on SDG 14 and 15 on Life below water and Life on land.
In ocean governance, voluntary commitments could become a game changer, enabled by 
‘Our Ocean conference series’ initiated in 2014, and the United Nations (UN) Ocean 
Conference held for the first time in 2017 (Neumann and Unger, 2019). Both conferences 
resulted in large numbers of voluntary commitments. Neumann and Unger (2019) stress 
the importance of developing consistent pledge and review systems for these 
commitments as a next step as well as an overarching registry. They furthermore note that 
the voluntary commitments oceans processes ideally should be harmonised with the 
post-2020 biodiversity framework. A key building blocks for such a strategy could be a 
unified and comprehensive global registry for voluntary commitments. The existing 
pledging schemes and registries of voluntary commitments under the UN Ocean and the 
Our Ocean conferences would lend themselves as strong starting points to developing 
such a global registry and reporting mechanism (Neumann and Unger, 2019).
Learning from past experience, observers have identified four promises and pitfalls 
regarding non-state and sub-national actions across issue areas (Chan et al., 2019). First, 
while non-state and sub-national actors could fill ‘governance gaps’ left by governments 
in the implementation of international agreements, it will be important to develop 
adequate monitoring and reporting systems. A lack of clear accounting procedures could 
lead to overestimations and double-counting of efforts in analysing the adequacy of 
commitments in view of realising agreed international goals and targets (see Widerberg 
and Pattberg, 2015). Second, non-state and sub-national action could improve policy-
making by providing information and knowledge and other governance functions as 
mentioned above, increase inclusivity, and stimulate co-benefits such as employment and 
innovation (Pattberg et al., 2019). However, geographical imbalances in implementation 
may benefit certain regions, primarily the global north and also may lead public 
authorities to delegate responsibility to private actors, including shirking of previous 
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agreements (Zelli and van Asselt, 2013). Third, non-state and sub-national action could 
provide solutions that are scalable and replicable, however, many have yet to demonstrate 
their effectiveness (see also van der Ven et al., 2016). Fourth, non-state and sub-national 
actors could have a catalytic effect, crowding in more actions and leveraging new 
resources by coalition-building and norm diffusion (see Chan et al., 2015). However, such 
effects depend on their local context and level of political support (Pattberg et al., 2019). 
In sum, including non-state and sub-national actions in the post-2020 biodiversity 
framework has a number of possible benefits. These include:
• engaging more and new actors in halting biodiversity loss and helping to mainstream 
biodiversity into relevant economic sectors and across society; 
• helping to build a positive momentum around global biodiversity conservation which is 
especially important in the run up to COP-15 in China in 2020;
• building confidence for governments to adopt more ambitious biodiversity goals, 
knowing that non-state and sub-national actors support stronger action; 
• fostering innovative and experimental partnerships and governance arrangements 
breaking gridlocks, for example between conservation community and productive 
sectors such as agriculture and fisheries; 
• providing a variety of governance functions, some of which receive less attention in 
public policies, including setting up standards and commitments, providing funding, 
creating and disseminating information, and executing projects on the ground.
The Action Agenda for Nature and People provides a platform and opportunity for 
harnessing these abovementioned potentials. Having outlined the new dynamics and 
potential of the Action Agenda, the next chapter provides an overview of current 
international cooperative initiatives for biodiversity, sketching the contours of an 
emerging global biodiversity governance landscape ‘beyond’ the CBD. 
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The landscape of international biodiversity governance is becoming increasingly crowded 
and diverse. The mapping of international cooperative initiatives in this chapter provides 
a first insight into which actors take what action and where. The chapter first describes the 
mapping approach and then presents the results.
3.1 Mapping approach
The mapping focuses on international cooperative initiatives for biodiversity, covering 
land, fresh water and oceans. These are initiatives that are: ‘(i) international and transnational 
institutions, which not only have the (ii) intention to guide policy and the behaviour of their members or a 
broader community, but also explicitly mention the (iii) common governance goal, accomplishable by (iv) 
significant governance functions’ (Widerberg et al., 2016). International cooperative initiatives 
consist of companies, civil society organisations, and national, regional or local 
governments working together in various constellations that are either public, private or 
hybrid (see Figure 1). Initiatives have different roles in the biodiversity governance 
landscape that we call governance functions: standards and commitments; information 
and networking; financing; and operational (Abbott, 2012; Pattberg et al., 2017). The 
mapping also includes biodiversity related multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs). National, local or individual initiatives are excluded.
For selecting initiatives, the mapping started with merging existing scientific databases 
produced by Pattberg et al. 2017 (updated in 2019); other IVM, PBL and IUCN databases; 
and, searching the internet and screening online databases (see Figure 2). This returned 
621 initiatives. However, several of the initiatives focus on issue areas that are only 
indirectly related to biodiversity. To identify initiatives that directly target biodiversity,  
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we selected those that self-identify as biodiversity initiatives. Statements were collected 
for each of the 621 initiative (e.g. mission statement, vision or strategic goals) describing 
their core focus. The statements were parsed for keywords identified by experts. The 
keywords were divided into three groups depending on their relevance (see Appendix). 
Tier 1 initiatives included the word ‘biodiversity’ (search string: ‘biodivers*’). Tier 2 
initiatives included ‘strong’ keywords associated with biodiversity. Tier 3 initiatives 
included ‘weak’ keywords. The tiered system helped the study team to create robust 
identification of relevant initiatives. Subsequently, eight experts reviewed the list of 
initiatives.
For each initiative, we collected data on starting year and on their members (public, 
private or civil society organisations). To be counted as a member, an organisation should 
thus have the potential to influence the rules and direction of the initiative, i.e. not 
merely adhering to their rules. For instance, in the Forest Stewardship Council, members 
are part of the governing council of the FSC. Those actors that use the FSC to label their 
products are not considered members. We also excluded individual people.
Figure 1
Source: PBL
International cooperative initiatives for biodiversity
International cooperative initiative for biodiversity
Civil society organisations





18 | Opportunities for the Action Agenda for Nature and People
The distribution of members also reflect their position in the ‘governance triangle’, which 
is a heuristic tool to organise transnational initiatives according to their composition 
(Abbott, 2012; Abbott and Snidal, 2009) (see Figure 3). The triangle helps the reader to 
understand what type of membership constellations that are most common and to what 
extent public actors, private actors and CSOs collaborate. The triangle consists of seven 
zones representing various constellations of members. Zone 1 contains only public 
initiatives, zone 2 only private initiatives by companies and zone 3 only civil society 
organisations. Zones 4, 5 and 6 contain various combinations between two types of the 
three actors and, zone 7 contains multi-stakeholder initiatives between public, private 
and civil society organisations.
Data on functions, themes, sectors, and geographical coverage were collected to determine 
what types of initiatives do what and where. As mentioned above, we distinguish between 
four different functions: standards and commitments, information and networking, 
financing and operational (Abbott, 2012; Pattberg et al., 2017), depicted in Figure 4.
Thematic focus was divided into four variables. First, what of the CBD’s main themes that 
the initiative addresses (conservation, sustainable use or access and benefit sharing), 
second, which sustainable development goal(s) the initiative addresses, third, what Aichi 
Target the initiative addresses, and finally, what of the CBD’s seven thematic programmes 
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We also collected data on the initiative’s year of initiation, geographical target area, 
budget, and headquarter location. Finally, for a subset of 99 initiatives that had the 
strongest match in terms of key words, we gathered data on their monitoring, reporting 
and verification procedures, to gain insight to whether they are following up on their 
commitments internally.
The next section describes and analyses the outcomes of the data-gathering effort. 
Figure 3
Source: based on Abbo and Snidal, 2009; Abbo, 2012; Paberg et al., 2007
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3.2  Depicting the landscape of international 
cooperative initiatives for biodiversity
A crowded and diverse landscape, with increasing participation of private and civil society actors…
We identified 331 initiatives that work internationally or transnationally on biodiversity. 
Even though there are initiatives that date back to the 1940’s and 50’s, primarily FAO 
related initiatives, the vast majority have started after the adoption of the CBD in 1992. 
Peaks of new initiatives being started can be seen around major biodiversity or 
environment related international events such as the Rio Conventions in 1992, the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002, and the Rio+20 Conference in 2012. 
The general trend is an increase in multi-stakeholder partnerships between public, private 
and civil society actors engaging in biodiversity through various initiatives suggesting 
that the landscape is becoming not only more crowded but also more diverse in terms of 
actors. In 1950, 73% of all initiatives were public compared to 34% in 2018. Respectively, in 
1950, 9% of all initiatives were private and 18% hybrid, compared to 28% and 39% in 2018 
(see Figure 5). 
Figure 4
Source: PBL
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…consisting of relatively small initiatives… 
Most initiatives are fairly small with less than 50 members; the average initiative has 415 
members, the median a mere 17 members. There are large differences in size of initiatives 
in terms of membership. The smallest initiatives have only a few members, whereas the 
largest ones incorporate thousands. The larger initiatives often focus on biodiversity-
related issues in supply chains, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil or the 
Better Cotton Initiative, or they are city networks such as ICLEI – Local Governments for 
Sustainability, with 1750 members. These large initiatives are set up as network structures, 
with horizontal decision-making procedures and governing councils being populated by 
members on a rotating and voluntary basis.
…involving primarily public and hybrid constellations… 
The distribution of initiatives in the governance triangle shows that public and multi-
stakeholder (or ‘hybrid’) initiatives are most frequently represented in the data (see Figure 6). 
One hundred and ten initiatives, equalling a third of all observations, are positioned in the 
upper zone, meaning that they comprise only public actors such as national governments, 
regions and cities. In second place, with 21%, we found hybrid initiatives, meaning that they 
include public, private and civil society actors. Hence, while businesses and CSOs are 
Figure 5
Source: PBL
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increasingly engaged in biodiversity, public actors are part of over 70% of all initiatives.  
The governance triangle also reveals that some actors are more prone to collaborate than 
others. There are three times more initiatives in which public actors and CSOs collaborate 
than public actors and businesses. Companies, thus, seem more likely to collaborate 
directly with CSOs or with public actors and CSOs in multi-stakeholder partnerships than 
with the public sector only. Also, when compared to the climate domain, the business 
sector seems not to operate very effectively on its own, suggesting it needs collaboration 
with partners from other sectors to be seen as credible in the biodiversity domain.
…engaging in networking and knowledge sharing activities…
Initiatives perform various governance functions (see Figure 7). The majority, about 60%, 
focus on information sharing and networking alone or in combination with other 
functions. Information sharing and networking could be multifaceted however. IFOAM 
– Organics International for instance, engages in awareness raising activities for consumers 
to buy organic foods through campaigning and providing a ‘resource centre’ for organic 
foods and agriculture. It also displays capacity building activities such as training farmers in 
organic methods as well as advocacy activities towards policy communities and decision-
Figure 6



















Total percentage does not add up to 100 because of rounding.
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makers regarding the perceived benefits of organic farming (https://www.ifoam.bio/). The 
second most popular (33%) governance function is ‘operational’ alone or in combination 
with other functions. Initiatives with operational functions implement projects on the 
ground such as the Global Ghost Gear Initiative, which provides a platform for projects all 
over the world that remove ‘ghost gear’ from the fishing industry referring to ‘any fishing 
gear that has been abandoned, lost or otherwise discarded, and is the most harmful form of 
marine debris’ (https://www.ghostgear.org/). The third most popular governance function 
is ‘standards and commitments’ (26%) where initiatives develop and implement voluntary 
rules for their members and other target actors. For instance, the Biodiversity Indicators 
Partnership (BIP) is a multi-stakeholder partnership that aims to produce biodiversity 
indicators for ‘the CBD and other biodiversity-related Conventions, for IPBES, for reporting 
on the Sustainable Development Goals, and for use by national and regional governments’ 
(https://www.bipindicators.net/). The BIP thus is active in collecting and creating new 
standards for how to measures progress in biodiversity conservation using a collaborative 
approach. Many standard and commitment initiatives focus on specific sectors or supply 
chains. The Better Cotton Initiative (https://bettercotton.org/) for example, focuses on the 
cotton production chain and has created the Better Cotton Standard System which measures 
economic, social and environmental aspects of cotton as a commodity. Finally, the least 
popular type of governance function is ‘financing’, which deals with various types of 
providing or facilitating biodiversity finance. The Biodiversity Finance Initiative for example 
helps countries with assessing current financial flows towards biodiversity, estimates gaps 
in biodiversity finance, identifies instruments for closing those gaps, and provides guidance 
on how to implement those instruments (https://www.biodiversityfinance.net/index.php/
about-biofin/biofin-approach).
Figure 7
International cooperative initiative for biodiversity that fulfil specific function
Source: PBL
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 ...focusing on forests and agriculture…
Beyond functions we also analysed in how far existing cooperative initiatives address 
governance goals incorporated in the CBD and SDGs. The by far most popular CBD 
programme-related theme is agriculture with 59% of all initiatives, followed by forests 
which engages 42% of the initiatives. Inland waters, Islands and Mountains are far less 
popular with about 18% each (see Figure 8). 
In terms of global goals set in multilateral processes (the SDGs and the Aichi targets) the 
distribution of thematic focus is perhaps not very surprising. 64% of the initiatives relate 
to SDG 15 – Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage 
forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss, and 32% 
to SDG 14 – Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development (see Figure 9). Concerning the Aichi targets, 40% of the initiatives are in line 
with target 4 – By 2020, at the latest, Governments, business and stakeholders at all levels have taken 
steps to achieve or have implemented plans for sustainable production and consumption and have kept the 
impacts of use of natural resources well within safe ecological limits, and 46% in line with target 7 
– By 2020 areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry are managed sustainably, ensuring 
conservation of biodiversity (see Figure 10). 
The distributions are also reflected in terms of sector focus where over 35% of the 
initiatives focus on forest exploration, 30% on oceans, 29% on smallholders, and 27% on 
agro-industry farming (note that one initiative can be part of several sector). Less popular 
Figure 8
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Figure 9
International cooperative initiatives addressing selected Sustainable Development Goals
Source: PBL
SDG
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sectors and cross-sectoral threats are extractive industries and invasive species with a 
respective 8% and 4% of the initiatives (see Figure 11).
…having headquarters in large cities in developed countries, targeting biodiversity issues in Africa 
and Europe…
Looking at the geographical spread of initiatives, there is a concentration of headquarters 
of initiatives in cities located in Europe and the United States, including London, 
Washington, Bonn and Rome. This distribution likely reflects the tendency of large 
international organisations, such as the World Bank or the FAO, to be hosting secretariats 
for the initiatives. It could also mean that initiatives strategically locate their headquarters 
in places where they are close to decision-making processes, such as the UNFCCC 
negotiations that have their secretariat as well as all intersessional meetings in Bonn.
The geographical target areas of the initiatives are better distributed than their 
headquarters. The best represented region in terms of target area is Africa followed by 
Europe. Large regions and countries including Latin America, China, and India are not as 
well represented in terms of number of initiatives. 
Figure 11
Source: PBL




































One initiaitve may address multiple sectors or cross-sectoral threats (n=331)
Sector
Cross-sectoral threat




273  The landscape of international cooperative initiatives for biodiversity  | 
…with monitoring mechanisms in place but weak targets and few sanctioning opportunities. 
Starting new voluntary commitments and initiatives are good for attracting publicity and 
creating goodwill. At some point, monitoring, reporting, verification (MRV) and, if 
needed, sanctioning becomes important building blocks for an Action Agenda. From a 
subset of 99 initiatives in our database, we therefore collected data on goals, MRV and 
sanctions. Nearly 80% of the initiatives have some kind of monitoring framework in place, 
and a little bit less than 50% of those even have annual reporting. In terms of setting 
targets, only 23% of the initiatives have quantitative targets. Such quantitative targets 
have been associated with more effective initiatives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2016). 
The Bonn Challenge for instance has a goal to ‘bring 150 million hectares of the world’s deforested 
and degraded land into restoration by 2020, and 350 million hectares by 2030’, making it both 
quantitative and time-bound (http://www.bonnchallenge.org/content/challenge). Such 
goals facilitate learning and understanding of what international cooperative initiatives 
contribute to global biodiversity goals. Finally, in cases of non-compliance, there seems to 
be few mechanisms in place for ‘punishing’ members. Only 12% of the initiatives report 
on any type of sanctioning mechanism.
Figure 12
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4 The way forward
The ‘Action Agenda for Nature and People’ is potentially a powerful vehicle for increasing 
the ambition level of global biodiversity policy and to move towards rapid and scalable 
implementation. To make the Action Agenda an effective part of the post-2020 framework, 
it will be important for parties and stakeholders to show leadership. Leadership is urgently 
needed to provide impetus; to structure and coordinate activities; and, build and 
maintain coalitions and partnerships (Kok et al., 2019; Rankovic et al, 2019).
Public, private and civil society actors already engage in a plethora of international 
cooperative initiatives. This policy brief presents a systematic mapping of already existing 
initiatives. 
A number of findings stand out:
• International cooperative initiatives for biodiversity are pervasive and cover public, 
hybrid and private organisational forms of collaboration. A transnational regime 
complex for global biodiversity governance has emerged and will likely continue to 
develop ‘beyond the CBD’, involving thousands of non-state and sub-national actors in 
the quest for halting biodiversity loss, but retaining the strong role of states.
• Business appears more likely to collaborate with CSOs directly or with public actors and 
CSOs in multi-stakeholder partnerships than with the public sector only. Also, when 
compared to the climate domain (Widerberg et al., 2016), companies seem not to 
operate much on their own, suggesting they need collaboration with other partners to 
be seen as a credible partner in the biodiversity domain.
• Initiatives are predominantly focusing on information sharing and networking (60%) 
followed by operational, on the ground, activities (33%) and third, standards and 
commitments (26%). The least common function is financing.
• Initiatives are active in areas with high biodiversity values, managed landscapes and 
urban areas, focussing both on conservation as well as on sustainable use in relevant 
production sectors and reflecting activities on the multiple values of nature. The most 
popular sectors, in terms of number of initiatives, are agriculture and forestry. 
• Mapping the geographical coverage of the initiatives suggests quite a broad distribution 
of activities. There is much activity in Europe and most part of the African continent. 
However, parts of Asia, primarily China and India, as well as Latin America feature less 
frequently in the data.
• From a subset of initiatives (n = 99), about 80% have some kind of monitoring in place 
suggesting awareness and possibility to track progress. Yet less than 50% have annual 
reporting and only about a fourth of the initiatives have quantitative targets, making 
evaluation efforts challenging.
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The mapping shows some areas where there could be more initiatives, but the overall 
picture that emerges suggest that there are thousands of public, private and civil society 
actors collaborating in hundreds of cooperative initiatives on various biodiversity related 
topics. The question for the post-2020 global biodiversity framework is how to build 
productive linkages between the CBD and the broader multilateral system and 
international cooperative initiatives. How can the CBD, through the post-2020 global 
biodiversity framework, best capture the benefits from non-state biodiversity initiatives 
already happening, as well as further enable non-state action (Kok et al., 2019; Pattberg et 
al., 2019; Rankovic et al., 2019)?
Short-term priorities – Building momentum towards COP-15 
The Action Agenda will evolve, over time. In the short term, prior to COP-15, the Action 
Agenda can help to build a positive momentum around global biodiversity governance to 
arrive at a meaningful post-2020 global framework. Non-state and sub-national actors 
outside the formal negotiations can exert pressure on international processes and may 
contribute to a strong post-2020 global biodiversity framework as agreed on by countries 
in Kunming. It would furthermore sow the seeds for what could become a more ‘Global 
Action Agenda for Nature and People’ as part of the actual design and implementation of 
post-2020 framework.
This means, first of all, that the narrative for the Action Agenda needs to be further developed 
(including an explanation of its priorities, functions and purposes), widely communicated 
and agreed on. Non-state and sub-national actors have to be convinced that there is much to 
gain from being part of this societal mobilisation and much to lose from not participating. 
Given the short time until COP-15, current efforts to develop the Action Agenda for Nature 
and People, for example by the secretariat of the CBD, would need to be intensified.
For the coming period, it seems therefore to be most important for non-state and 
sub-national actors and countries to generate as many voluntary non-state commitments 
as possible and make them visible at the portal for the Action Agenda to show an 
emerging ’groundswell’ of action. This means submitting new commitments, but also 
including and expanding on pledges that have been made, over the last few years in the 
CBD, by various non-state actors; these initiatives need to be included in the current 
process and lessons learned must also be taken into account.
Providing non-state and sub-national actors with an equal opportunity to pledge their 
commitment requires an official platform and registry where these can be aggregated. 
This can be done on the website that has been launched by the CBD. Such portal to bring 
all commitments together and showcase them is an important element of the Action 
Agenda, but should not be seen as the only one.
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Furthermore, the Action Agenda for Nature and People needs to be linked with other 
action agendas and portals (i.e. those for climate, ocean, SDGs, cities and biodiversity), as 
in these policy domains action agendas are also being developed as part of their 
international institutional frameworks. The CBD has to relate to, build on and collaborate 
with these processes, because many of these commitments are highly relevant for 
biodiversity and vice versa. Building on and collaborating with other policy agendas and 
already existing non-state and sub-national platforms can align the expectations and 
actions of different actors towards desired changes (and attract new ones). Leveraging the 
momentum and data collected in other policy domains could be beneficial since many of 
the commitments made in other policy domains also have implications for biodiversity 
and could be made visible in the context of the CBD without necessarily having to be 
resubmitted to the CBD. Stressing the linkages and interdependence between biodiversity 
loss and other key societal challenges, such as climate change, oceans and the broader 
SDG agenda will also raise the political profile of biodiversity conservation.
A high-level Biodiversity Summit as scheduled for the General Assembly in September 2020, 
for both government officials and non-state actors, will help to raise the profile of 
biodiversity and improve cooperation and provide an important platform for exchanging 
knowledge and information. Such an event could be organised on an annual basis, to 
ensure increased cooperation and ensure that non-state and sub-national biodiversity 
action stays on the political agenda.
Encouraging actors to engage in the process needs to be done with as little formal burden 
as possible, but some basic process criteria will be required. To ensure credibility, pledges 
and voluntary commitments should indicate ambition levels (what to achieve), how to 
achieve those levels (i.e. the measures) and how monitoring and reporting will be done. 
These commitments will need to become publicly available and transparent to facilitate 
learning. 
Challenges for the Action Agenda
We also identified some challenges for the CBD to develop and implement the Action 
Agenda successfully. 
First, there is much debate on if, how and who can coordinate non-state and sub-national 
biodiversity action. The CBD Secretariat, for instance, is unlikely to have the willingness or 
capacity to take on such a potentially immense task of guiding a vast and heterogeneous 
group of actors. Instead, the Secretariat, in collaboration with other key organisations, 
such as IUCN, ICLEI or the Natural Capital Coalition, could provide a focal point for 
facilitating dialogue between partners during and between COPs. Such a ‘soft touch’ 
approach would have the purpose to build coalitions of the willing among governments, 
cities, companies and civil society organisations that could spearhead the Action Agenda. 
 
Second, by introducing non-state and sub-national actors to the global biodiversity 
regime, national governments may try to shirk established norms and responsibility for 
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implementation under the CBD, relying on action being taken outside the formal 
negotiations. To be able to deal with this, accountability systems need to be developed 
that include both national and non-state and sub-national commitments. Periodic 
assessment of the progress made by non-state and sub-national actors could be carried 
out by a broader analytical community of international organisations, think tanks, 
academia and other research organisations. A format for doing so could be one that is 
similar to the annual Emissions Gap Report produced by UNEP aimed at the climate 
change policy domain. 
Third, how to leverage international initiatives and coalitions to achieve biodiversity 
goals? Lessons learned for success of multi-stakeholder partnerships include improved 
MRV procedures, enhanced involvement of relevant actors and the fact that disclosure is 
required to enhance transparency. To further enhance partnerships, science-based targets 
and methodologies that could be used at a national or sectoral level would allow non-state 
actors to set their own targets aligned with international goals and targets to identify 
strategies and actions to achieve these targets. 
Fourth, credibility remains a key challenge, proving that non-state and sub-national actor 
move from word to action. The threats of greenwashing and bluewashing are ever present, 
with companies getting access to the CBD for public relation purposes without having 
demonstrated actual improvements to biodiversity. It is therefore important to emphasise 
the role of analysis and transparency, providing decision-makers in both private and 
public organisations with the proper basis for deciding whether to engage in or support 
an initiative. 
Medium-term prospects – the Action Agenda as part of the post-2020 biodiversity framework
If a strong Action Agenda emerges in the coming 18 months, further engagement from the 
CBD and its parties will be expected by non-state and sub-national actors. These actors 
need to be included in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework in a meaningful way.
Therefore, the longer term challenge is to link the Action Agenda with existing and newly 
envisioned implementation mechanisms within CBD. Beyond COP-15, the question then 
becomes if and how the Action Agenda can become part of the post-2020 framework and 
how the Action Agenda will relate to the existing and new CBD implementation 
mechanisms (National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs), national 
reporting, accountability mechanisms, ratcheting). Questions have been raised how 
non-state voluntary commitments would relate to (voluntary) biodiversity commitments 
by Parties. If the post-2020 Biodiversity framework would indeed decide on a commitment 
process comparable to those of the National Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the 
ratcheting mechanism towards objectives of the Paris Agreement, national commitments 
will most likely be based on the NBSAPs of Parties. Non-state commitments will be 
additional and may to a certain extent overlap with the national commitments of Parties. 
This would need to be dealt with further as part of a strengthened accountability 
mechanism in the post-2020 framework. 
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After COP-15, accountability requirements will need to increase for non-state actors and a 
monitoring, reporting and verification system needs to be put in place (the Yearbook of 
Global Climate Action and the UNEP Emissions Gap Report could serve as examples here). 
Efforts to independently monitor and assess progress by non-state and sub-national actors 
are necessary to prevent voluntary commitments that are neither monitorable nor 
measurable, as was the case in Johannesburg 2002 and Rio+20 in 2012 (Ramstein, 2012). 
The role of this such MRV system would be (as also suggested by Neumann and Unger 
(2019) in the Oceans domain) to take stock of voluntary commitments; report on progress 
on implementation; provide transparency and independent verification; facilitate 
learning amongst initiatives, provide joint quality criteria for voluntary commitments; 
identify trends and highlight thematic and geographical gaps; and analyse distance and 
progress to the new goals and targets. An MRV system which encourages experimentation 
and learning is likely to be more effective, compared to an approach that would focus too 
strongly on criteria and stringent MRV procedures. The right balance between mandatory 
registration criteria and accountability processes, and freedom of experimentation, must 
be found. 
Further involvement of non-state and sub-national actors in the post-2020 framework, for 
example in broader stocktaking and review mechanisms could help them to better display 
actions with a positive contribution to biodiversity and their contribution to new globally 
agreed targets. In this way, non-state and sub-national actors would be given a more 
formal position in the process. In addition, showcasing their actions could help to 
increase state ambitions, by showing the willingness of non-state actors to take action in 
their respective sectors and realms. 
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Abbreviations 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
COP Conference of the Parties
IPBES Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services
MRV Monitoring Reporting Verification
NBSAPs National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTTA Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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